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There is frequent public and media concern over the
cost of bloated cabinets in many Sub-Saharan African
countries. Scholarship on elite clientelism links cabinet
positions with corruption and practices that undermine
sound policymaking. This article presents new data on
the number of ministers in African governments and
documents a robust negative association with several
measures of governance, both across countries and in a
regression framework that exploits within-country varia-
tion over time and accounts for various potential con-
founders. This suggests policymakers, donors, investors,
and citizens should pay close attention to the number of
ministers appointed to the cabinet. Although the article
cautions against simplistic policy prescriptions, a sizable
increase in the number of ministers is likely bad news
for governance.
The number of ministers appointed to the cabinet is a frequent concern in many developing
countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2017, Ghana's President, Nana Akufo-Addo,
appointed the largest cabinet in a quarter of a century, prompting the opposition to condemn
his “elephant size” government (Reuters, 2017). Conversely, when in May 2019 South Africa's
President Cyril Ramaphosa cut the number of cabinet ministers from 36 to 28, many observers
interpreted this as an attempt to tackle government corruption (Reuters, 2019). Beyond these
anecdotes, is there a systematic relationship between the number of ministers in the cabinet, or
cabinet size, and governance outcomes? We focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, where public and
Received: 2 June 2020 Revised: 12 October 2020 Accepted: 3 January 2021
DOI: 10.1111/gove.12575
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2021 The Authors. Governance published by Wiley Periodicals, LLC.
Governance. 2021;1–19. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/gove 1
media concerns about an excessive number of ministers are common, and where prior scholar-
ship links cabinet appointments with corruption and poor governance.
Some existing studies examine cabinet size as a determinant of government performance.
One focus has been on the “common pool resource” problem in budgeting, which implies that
more ministers lead to higher spending and larger deficits. Empirical work covers mostly indus-
trialized democracies (Perotti & Kontopoulos, 2002; Volkerink & de Haan, 2001) and some
emerging market economies and developing countries (Wehner, 2010; Woo, 2003). A more
recent study by LeVan and Assenov (2016) looks at Sub-Saharan African countries, concluding
that more ministries may increase expenditure but not deficits. With some exceptions discussed
in the following section, other theoretical perspectives and potential consequences of cabinet
size are far less frequently considered.
This article advances the study of how executive structures shape development and gover-
nance. First, we broaden the examination of the consequences of cabinet size beyond public
finances, drawing on a different literature that links clientelism and cabinet appointments.
Based on this perspective, we present systematic empirical evidence confirming that public con-
cern over the governance implications of oversized cabinets is justified. In addition, our study
provides a consistent and openly available update of an important data set that tracks the evolu-
tion of cabinets in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1971 to 2001 (Arriola, 2009), thus enabling further
research.
We commence by setting out how cabinet size may affect governance, drawing on the litera-
ture concerned with elite clientelism and related work on African politics. We then present new
data on cabinet size in Sub-Saharan African countries, extending prior work by Arriola (2009),
and assess their association with a series of governance measures related to corruption and the
quality of public policy. Analyzing cross-national patterns as well as within-country variation
over time, we find a robust correlation between cabinet size and several measures of gover-
nance in this sample. The conclusion summarizes policy implications and explores possible ave-
nues for further research.
1 | FROM CABINETS TO GOVERNANCE
Scholars of African politics have highlighted a link between clientelism and cabinet appoint-
ments. Van de Walle (2012) distinguishes mass clientelism and elite clientelism. Mass cli-
entelism relies on using state resources, or patronage, to provide jobs and services for mass
clienteles, typically involving party structures and electoral politics. This type of clientelism
requires considerable resources and is therefore likely to take place in richer countries, also
Western democracies. For poorer countries, on the other hand, clientelism is more likely to be
limited to a narrower clientele, so-called elite clientelism. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the dominant
form of elite clientelism is prebendalism, or “the strategic political allocation of public offices to
key elites” (van de Walle, 2012, p. 113).1 In such settings, a cabinet position forms the top eche-
lon of elite offices and can be seen as the ultimate gift, “bringing with it patronage opportunities
as well as significant perks and status-enhancing privileges” (van de Walle, 2001, p. 103; see
also Kroeger, 2018; LeVan & Assenov, 2016).
Elite clientelism in the form of prebendalism is closely linked to grand corruption, which
channels benefits other than the official salary to a political office holder. By promoting loyalty
to the leader through the provision of rent-seeking opportunities to key political allies, such a
system is permissive of corruption (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Moreover, prebendalism
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hampers “horizontal accountability” (O'Donnell, 1998) through courts, auditors, investigative
agencies, or legislatures. Such institutions can be undermined by appointing allies and cronies
to them who sabotage troublesome investigations (e.g., Pauw, 2017). And the handing out of
cabinet positions to members of parliament based on loyalty acts as a disincentive for them to
exercise effective oversight. For instance, Ghana's former President John Kufuor picked about
three-quarters of his cabinet ministers from among parliamentarians, who in order to be con-
sidered had to be loyal rather than scrutinize the executive (Lindberg, 2010).2 In an earlier
empirical analysis, Mills (2012) uses data for 42 African countries over the period 1985–2010 to
show that cabinet size has a positive association with grand corruption. In this article, we signif-
icantly expand this analysis in terms of coverage and the measures of governance considered.
Elite clientelism can be contained by programmatic political parties, which appeal to voters
on the basis of specific policies that are grounded in an ideological program (Keefer, 2013, p. 7).
Programmatic parties are able to solve collective action problems and make credible commit-
ments to deliver public goods, which requires mechanisms to discipline and sanction party
leaders and members whose actions are not conducive to delivering promised policies. In con-
trast, clientelist politicians prefer discretion and weak oversight of the implementation of poli-
cies, so that they can extract personal benefits and channel resources to their supporters
(Cruz & Keefer, 2015). This implies that the potential for cabinet size to be associated with poor
governance and corruption is especially likely in settings where programmatic political parties
are weak or absent, as is the case in many Sub-Saharan African countries.
Clientelistic politics is not the only driver of cabinet size. Examining data on post-war cabi-
nets in 17 Western European countries, Indridason and Bowler (2014) find that inter-party poli-
tics influences the size of the cabinet. As coalition parties require an agreement about the
division of ministerial portfolios, increasing the size of the cabinet can at times smooth that pro-
cess. Portfolios tend to be allocated roughly proportional to the governing parties' legislative
strength. Achieving proportionality is difficult in small cabinets, but the problem can often be
solved by adding a portfolio. Intra-party politics matters, too, when otherwise dissatisfied party
members or factions are brought on board by altering the size of the cabinet. The need for coali-
tion building through cabinet appointments is not limited to parliamentary democracies, as
Cheibub (2007) shows for presidential systems in Latin America.
These arguments translate into the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, where cabinet appoint-
ments and changes can help presidents to consolidate their hold on power (Arriola, 2009; Fran-
cois et al., 2015). The co-opting of elites helps to explain why cabinets can get larger at
strategically important moments, notably ahead of elections.3 Moreover, a “winner-takes-all”
political system can be unstable, and governments may face frequent threats of coups. Where
presidents use ministerial appointments to buy loyalty from members of the elite who might
otherwise mount leadership challenges, enlarging the cabinet can increase political stability
(Hyden, 2006, p. 104). A study of cabinets in 40 African countries over the period 1970–2000
confirms that cabinet appointments can extend a leader's tenure and lower the probability of
being deposed through a coup, unless leaders overextend their coalitions (Arriola, 2009,
p. 1350). Torgler and Frey (2012) analyze data for 100 countries over 20 years and find that large
cabinets reduce the likelihood of an assassination attempt on leading officials or politicians.
This helps to explain why power sharing arrangements have been used across Africa during
attempts to resolve conflict. Somalia, for example, had especially large cabinets following the
establishment of the Transitional Federal Government in 2004.
Overall, this discussion yields expectations about the relationship between cabinet size and
governance outcomes. In Sub-Saharan Africa, bloated cabinets indicate elite clientelism,
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suggesting that additional ministers are likely to increase corruption. The latter undermines
government effectiveness by diverting scarce resources from essential public services (Ablo &
Reinikka, 1998). Rent-seeking ministers also have incentives to weaken the rule of law and reg-
ulatory quality in order to be unincumbered by independent judges or transparent procedures
(Pauw, 2017; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016, p. 382–389). Yet, in analyzing these relationships,
we need to account for other factors that are also associated with both cabinet size and gover-
nance outcomes, such as pressures to build coalitions or to manage conflict. Moreover, while
this discussion posits that the direction of causality is from the size of the cabinet to governance,
we are mindful that the opposite may be plausible, too. We return to this point following the
introduction of our data set and the presentation of our empirical results.
2 | A NEW DATA SET
To take a fresh empirical look at the relationship between cabinet size and governance and pol-
icy outcomes, we assemble a range of relevant data for Sub-Saharan African countries. The vari-
ables we include fall into three main groups, which we introduce below. Appendix A provides
full variable definitions and sources and summary statistics are in Table A1.
The main independent variable of interest is the number of cabinet ministers. No off-the-
shelf data set exists that reliably captures this information. The Cross-National Time-Series Data
Archive initiated by Arthur Banks includes the size of the cabinet.4 However, the sources used
are not fully disclosed and the manual warns that “[i]n many cases, counts are approximate”.
Instead, we build on Arriola's (2009) data set on cabinet size, as it is coded on the basis of infor-
mation on the membership of cabinets obtained from a single high-quality source, Europa Pub-
lications' Africa South of the Sahara, which is published annually. Focusing on political heads
who are ultimately in charge of government departments, the data set records the number of
ministers with full cabinet rank for each country and year in the sample. Excluded are members
of the executive without cabinet rank, notably junior or deputy ministers, and individuals with
lower-level executive functions, as their authority and discretion is limited. This approach
ensures the greatest possible consistency.
We updated Arriola's (2009) data set to 2014 and expanded the countries included to 48, with
a total of 1,797 observations. Median cabinet size over this period is 22 and the mean is 23, but
there is tremendous dispersion both within and between countries. Cabinet size in our sample
ranges from 5 (the Comoros in 2002) to 53 (Cameroon in 2006). Figure 1 summarizes the data
by country.5 Figure 2 shows the evolution of cabinet size in the region over the period covered
by the updated data set. Cabinets were more compact at the very beginning of the period, with
a mean of just 16 in 1971. Arriola (2009, p. 1347) notes an upward trend, with the mean
reaching 24 by the end of the century. The new data show that the average cabinet in the region
continued to expand in the new millennium, to 27 in 2014, with substantial dispersion around
the mean.
We examine the relationship of cabinet size with a number of plausible outcome measures
indicated by the preceding discussion. One principal source is the well-known Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) data set produced by the World Bank since 1996, which includes
perception-based estimates across several dimensions of governance, aggregating up a number
of variables from different sources (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Of these indicators, we use the vari-
ables that are closely linked to the predictions generated in the previous section. These include
the measures that relate to the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and
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FIGURE 1 Variation in cabinet size in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1971–2014. The dashed line indicates the pooled
sample median (22). N = 1,797. The data are from Arriola (2009) with authors' updates coded from subsequent
editions of Europa Publications, Africa South of the Sahara
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implement sound policies (Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality) and the respect of
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among
them (Rule of Law, Control of Corruption). The prior discussion of elite clientelism suggests
that cabinet size should be negatively associated with all four of these measures.
There is an extensive debate around the validity and methodology of the WGI (Anheier
et al., 2018; Apaza, 2009). Whether these measures capture distinct concepts is disputed, and
Langbein and Knack (2010) conclude that they appear to measure the same broad concept. For
robustness, we also use a novel corruption index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) pro-
ject that captures executive corruption and is based on expert scoring (see also Bäck
et al., 2019).6 We further include the well-known Corruption Perceptions Index produced by
Transparency International. It would be ideal to have objective measures of corruption, but
these tend to be country specific—such as audit outcomes indicating corruption (Ferraz &
Finan, 2008) or amounts of funding diverted from authorized purposes (Olken, 2007). Hence,
perception-based measures remain important, especially when examining cross-national data.
A final addition is from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Here, we use their mea-
sure of human development, aggregating 26 indicators of service provision and outcomes
related to welfare, education, and health, which prior research shows are negatively affected by
corruption (e.g., Reinikka & Svensson, 2011). This measure complements the previous ones by
focusing on the consequences for essential services that directly affect the vast majority of the
population, such as primary school completion and immunization. To ensure comparability
and to aid interpretation, where required, we rescale measures to a theoretical range from zero
to 100.7 Despite different methodological approaches and variation in focus, most of these mea-
sures are highly correlated (see Table A2).
We draw on the World Bank/Inter-American Development Bank's Database of Political
Institutions to control for a number of underlying pressures on cabinet size identified in the pre-
ceding section. We include the partisan fractionalization of the executive, as multi-party coali-
tions may lead to increased cabinet size to accommodate politicians from across the different
parties that participate in the government. Next, we use indicators of whether the chief execu-
tive or defense minister are military officers. A strong presence of military officers may suggest
FIGURE 2 Evolution of
cabinet size over time,
1971–2014. Based on the
data summarized in
Figure 1. The solid line
indicates the annual sample
mean and the dots represent
annual observations. The
gap in 1976 is due to
missing data for most
countries for this year and
the mean line is smoothed
over this gap
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threats to the stability of the government, which presidents might attempt to manage by enlarg-
ing the number of ministers to accommodate important allies and potential rivals. In addition,
we use the coding by Cruz and Keefer (2015) to account for the presence of programmatic
parties, which can limit clientelism and promote cohesive policies.
Moreover, we measure the number of years the chief executive has been in office. A long
tenure may suggest that elite clientelism is particularly entrenched and highly personalized. At
the time of writing, the longest-serving president in the world is Teodoro Obiang Nguema
Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, who took office in 1979. Equatorial Guinea is also among the
worst countries in the world on several governance indicators—in 2014, for instance, it had the
worst score of all countries in our sample on the Control of Corruption measure. Next, to
account for the possibility that corruption responds to electoral pressures, we control for the
number of years before the end of the current electoral term. Further, it is possible that close
links between the government and business may affect a government's approach to regulation
and policy, or its susceptibility to bribes. To account for this possibility, we include an indicator
of whether the head of the executive is from a party to the left of the ideological spectrum.
These measures, too, are from the Database of Political Institutions.
Finally, we also account for the broader political and economic context of a country.
Democracies have checks and balances that can help to limit corruption and expose the selec-
tion of leaders to electoral competition, so we control for it alternatively with variables from the
Polity and V-Dem data sets. Moreover, as prior research finds that economic development is
associated with better government performance (La Porta et al., 1999), we include GDP per
capita (from the World Development Indicators data set). The full data set for this article is
openly available as part of the replication archive.
3 | RESULTS
For a first look at the bivariate relationship of cabinet size with governance we average the
available data for the 10 most recent years included in our data set and focus on cross-national
patterns. The results are displayed in Figure 3. All measures of governance have a negative rela-
tionship with cabinet size, which in all seven panels (a to g) implies worse governance. All cor-
relations are significant at the 1% level with coefficients ranging from −0.49 (for Control of
Corruption) to −0.13 (Regulatory Quality). Yet there is a substantial amount of variation that is
not accounted for by cabinet size, which is expected. These cross-national patterns are affected
by a potentially large number of observable and unobservable characteristics.
To probe these relationships further, we run a set of regressions that exploit within-country
variation and account for several potentially confounding variables discussed above. The basic
specification is as follows:
Governancei,t = β1Cabineti,t + βkControlsi,t + Countryi + Yeart + εi,t
A governance indicator for country i in year t is regressed onto our measure of cabinet size
and k controls discussed in the previous section. Country fixed effects absorb unchanging coun-
try characteristics and much of the explanatory power of slowly or rarely changing variables,
such as a country's size or natural geographic features, the ethnic heterogeneity of its popula-
tion, or whether it has a presidential or parliamentary system of government. Year effects
account for common shocks that may have region-wide governance implications. In particular,
the collapse of the Soviet Union altered the politics of foreign aid and increased the effective-
ness of Western development assistance in promoting governance reforms across the region
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(Dunning, 2004). Subsequently, the emergence of China as a major aid actor sparked debates
about the implications this may have for development and governance in Africa
(Brautigam, 2009; Woods, 2008). Our inclusion of country and year fixed effects thus helps to
contain bias by accounting for a range of potential confounders in these two categories.
Table 1 displays the results. As in the cross-country averages, cabinet size has a consistently
negative association with measures of governance in these regressions. The coefficients on this
variable are significant in five of seven cases, except for Regulatory Quality and the Executive
Corruption Index, where they get close to statistical significance at conventional levels. Substan-
tively, the size of the coefficients appears modest: Adding 10 ministers to the cabinet is associ-
ated with reductions of up to 2.3 percentage points across these measures of governance. Yet
given that many countries in the region have low scores on these indicators, the estimated con-
sequences of plausible changes to cabinet size would not be negligible. For instance, our results
imply that Angola's Corruption Perceptions Index score in 2014 would have been more than
15% higher, at 22 rather than 19, if instead of 36 ministers its cabinet had been half that size, as
in nearby Botswana.8 Looking at the control variables, two patterns stand out: rich countries do
better on these measures and left leaders tend to do worse.
Although the time series available for most measures of governance is short, which gives
rise to Nickell bias in dynamic models with fixed effects, we checked whether our results are
robust to including a lagged dependent variable. We exclude the data from the Ibrahim Index,
which only start in 2008. These supplementary results are reported in Table 2. In terms of our
variable of interest, the basic pattern of results goes through. While the coefficients on the cabi-
net size variable are smaller, the estimates still achieve statistical significance at conventional
FIGURE 3 Cabinet size has a negative correlation with governance indicators, 2005–2014 averages. The
variables on the Y-axes are from the September 2018 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI;
panels a–d), various editions of the Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International
(TI; panel e), the July 2018 version of the V-Dem data set (panel f), and the 2018 Ibrahim Index of African
Governance (IIAG; panel g). See Appendix A for full variable definitions and sources. Country codes are taken
from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and included in Table A3. The available data are averaged over
the 2005–2014 period
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levels in three of six regressions. Executive corruption as measured with the V-Dem data is
largely accounted for by the lagged dependent variable. In terms of control variables, one nota-
ble change is that the coefficients on the democracy measures are more precisely estimated.
Democracy has a positive and statistically significant association with three of six governance
measures.
TABLE 1 Main regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GE RQ RL CC CPI ECI IIAG
Cabinet size −0.143*** −0.103 −0.167*** −0.153*** −0.158** −0.228 −0.063**
(0.051) (0.063) (0.053) (0.053) (0.072) (0.179) (0.030)
Polity 0.137 0.244 0.416** 0.039 −0.163 0.004
(0.200) (0.176) (0.164) (0.140) (0.183) (0.112)
Electoral democracy 13.353
(11.674)
Left −3.044** −0.861 −2.441* −3.256** −1.979* −1.601 0.222
(1.249) (1.355) (1.403) (1.227) (1.022) (1.950) (1.081)
Government
fractionalization
−2.751 −1.724 −0.703 −1.500 −1.165 3.603 −0.209
(2.553) (1.973) (1.746) (1.772) (1.688) (4.748) (1.718)
Programmatic
parties
1.393 0.976 1.265 0.639 −0.725 0.883 −3.092
(1.546) (1.199) (1.231) (1.368) (2.002) (4.086) (2.224)
GDP per capita 8.476* 12.307*** 8.101** 6.881** 12.186*** 6.882 5.808
(4.258) (3.750) (3.537) (2.744) (2.414) (5.385) (3.781)
Military 0.574 0.342 −0.202 0.484 −4.378*** −1.899 −0.183
(1.218) (1.146) (1.069) (0.735) (0.962) (3.729) (0.839)
Defense minister −0.099 0.633 1.559 0.503 −2.189* 1.306 −0.239
(1.265) (1.254) (1.151) (0.579) (1.129) (1.907) (0.725)
Years in office 0.088 0.137** 0.075 −0.069 0.030 −0.200 −0.001
(0.067) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.129) (0.048)
Years to election 0.095 0.096 0.050 0.061 0.053 −0.025 0.021
(0.071) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.119) (0.177) (0.081)
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 561 561 561 479 1,017 262
R-squared (within) 0.213 0.237 0.212 0.152 0.457 0.151 0.512
Countries 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Note: Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Dependent variables are from the September 2018 update of the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (estimates of GE, Government Effectiveness; RQ, Regulatory Quality; RL, Rule of Law; CC,
Control of Corruption), various editions of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the July 2018 version of the V-Dem data set
(ECI, Executive Corruption Index, reversed), and the 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). See Appendix A for




WEHNER AND MILLS 9
We also considered further specifications that are included in our replication files
(Wehner & Mills, 2021). It is possible that an increase in cabinet size takes time to translate into
a deterioration in governance, for example if politicians once appointed need time to
TABLE 2 Supplementary regressions with lagged dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GE RQ RL CC CPI ECI
Cabinet size −0.076** −0.035 −0.090*** −0.097*** −0.061 0.005
(0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.042) (0.034)
Polity 0.225** 0.219*** 0.305** 0.161 −0.093
(0.096) (0.076) (0.136) (0.111) (0.087)
Electoral democracy 3.937
(3.302)
Left −1.696*** −0.156 −1.146** −1.455** −0.274 −0.843
(0.497) (0.554) (0.459) (0.642) (0.497) (0.553)
Government fractionalization −2.177* 0.460 −1.148 −0.322 −0.864 −0.357
(1.196) (0.974) (1.163) (1.156) (1.162) (0.960)
Programmatic parties −0.047 −0.482 0.305 −0.765 −0.362 0.593
(0.617) (0.776) (0.740) (0.907) (0.963) (0.870)
GDP per capita 3.816** 2.934* 3.545** 2.873* 4.191** −1.127
(1.884) (1.517) (1.602) (1.578) (1.927) (0.762)
Military −0.497 0.834 1.016 0.558 −1.737** 1.978**
(0.620) (0.518) (1.221) (0.383) (0.693) (0.842)
Defense minister −0.270 −0.470 1.246** 0.430 −1.083* 0.014
(0.506) (0.357) (0.562) (0.589) (0.642) (0.491)
Years in office 0.055** 0.053*** 0.010 −0.035 −0.042* −0.015
(0.026) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018)
Years to election 0.037 −0.023 −0.036 −0.019 0.063 −0.002
(0.050) (0.058) (0.054) (0.070) (0.084) (0.066)
Lagged dependent variable 0.520*** 0.656*** 0.622*** 0.634*** 0.598*** 0.935***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.079) (0.051) (0.020)
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 436 436 436 436 440 1,001
R-squared (within) 0.483 0.580 0.577 0.552 0.698 0.848
Countries 40 40 40 40 40 40
Note: Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Dependent variables are from the September 2018 update of the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (estimates of GE, Government Effectiveness; RQ, Regulatory Quality; RL, Rule of Law; CC,
Control of Corruption), various editions of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and the July 2018 version of the V-Dem




10 WEHNER AND MILLS
manipulate regulations or to extract bribes. When we lag the number of ministers, the overall
pattern of results is very similar. Compared with the main results in Table 1, the magnitude of
the coefficients of interest decreases in three regressions and increases in four, and six of them
now achieve statistical significance at conventional levels.
Recall that our discussion of programmatic parties highlighted their interest to contain elite
clientelism to ensure the delivery of promised policies (Keefer, 2013). Hence, the presence of
programmatic parties might dampen, even eliminate, the negative effect of cabinet size on gov-
ernance. A related argument, assuming disciplined political parties, has been made in the litera-
ture on cabinet size and fiscal policy, which in a different sample finds that the positive effect of
the number of ministers on spending and deficits is increasing in partisan fragmentation
(Wehner, 2010, p. 646). We augment our basic model with an interaction between cabinet size
and our measure of programmatic parties (Kam & Franzese, 2007). The coefficient on the inter-
action term has an unexpected negative sign in five out of the seven regressions, but it never
reaches conventional thresholds of statistical significance. Whether another measure of pro-
grammatic parties, or a different context, would yield stronger evidence for a conditional effect
deserves attention in follow-up work.
In addition, we considered whether the effect of cabinet size on governance may depend
on the system of government. This could matter for the type of politician who becomes a
minister and for the degree to which the chief executive can sanction individual cabinet
members for corruption or poor performance. Presidents potentially have a much wider min-
isterial talent pool then prime ministers in parliamentary systems, who depend on the confi-
dence of their parliament and—either de jure or de facto—are likely to select ministers more
narrowly from among its members. Although a number of African countries had parliamen-
tary forms of government at independence, many soon switched so this group is now small
and consists of Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, and South Africa (Robinson &
Torvik, 2016). A far larger number has a presidential or some form of semi-presidential sys-
tem. As a result, any regressions in this sample are highly sensitive to small variations in the
countries classified as parliamentary. Moreover, this distinction is correlated with many
other time-invariant or slowly changing country characteristics, such as legal origin and
colonial heritage.
With this limitation in mind, we nonetheless checked whether the relationship between
cabinet size and governance in this sample is conditional on whether a country has parliamen-
tary form of government. When we augment our main model with an interaction between cabi-
net size and an indicator of the five parliamentary systems noted above, the coefficient on the
interaction term is negative in three regressions and statistically significant in two of these. The
coefficient on the interaction term is positive, although statistically insignificant albeit border-
line in one instance, in the remaining four regressions. We hesitate to draw conclusions from
such a mixed pattern of results, and the data limitations discussed above do not allow us take
this analysis further in meaningful ways. Therefore, we recommend this line of inquiry for
another context that offers greater variation in the form of government.
One final caveat: While our estimates document robust correlation, our data do not allow
us to clarify the direction of these relationships. Does an increase in the size of the cabinet
lead to worse governance? Or do venal rulers appoint large cabinets? In other words, while
our setup assumes that the direction of causality is from the size of the cabinet to gover-
nance, the opposite is plausible, too. This uncertainty about reciprocal causality needs to be
tackled in follow-up work with empirical settings that allow the identification of causal
effects.
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4 | CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The overall takeaway from our analysis is that cabinet size has a negative association with a basket
of widely used measures of governance, both when looking at cross-country averages and when we
exploit within-country variation. This pattern is robust to a demanding regression framework that
accounts for time-invariant country characteristics and common shocks, as well as several variables
the literature identifies as linked to the number of ministers, and which may also affect governance
outcomes. We acknowledge that further research needs to investigate reciprocal causation and clar-
ify the extent to which large cabinets lead to corruption, or vice versa. Although we make no causal
claims, the systematic and robust correlations we document have significant policy relevance.
One crucial implication is that a large increase in cabinet size should alert policymakers,
donors, investors, and citizens of the potential impact on governance. In Kenya, for example,
presidents have used cabinet appointments as instruments of patronage, resulting in cabinets of
more than 30 ministers as well as similar numbers of assistant ministers. The inflation in cabi-
net positions must have been perceived as having been associated with bad outcomes, since a
restriction to 22 cabinet secretaries was drafted into the new constitution of 2010 (Kramon &
Posner, 2011). Indeed, assuming that there is a fixed amount of resources to monitor individual
politicians, a more compact number of ministers may allow for more concentrated oversight
and could strengthen accountability. Interpreting increases in the size of the cabinet as an early
warning signal of potential governance deteriorations could help to mobilize and speed up the
response from actors who may be able to counter this threat.
At the same time, where the political reward system is based on extra-legal perks, formalis-
tic approaches may not yield intended consequences, unless they also tackle these underlying
dynamics. This is one reason why anti-corruption commissions across Africa and elsewhere
have a mixed track record in fighting corruption (Doig et al., 2005; Rose-Ackerman &
Palifka, 2016, p. 391–395). Moreover, allowance might have to be made for the political man-
agement functions of cabinet appointments, which can contribute to overall stability and help
contain political tensions—even if this entails a price in terms of other dimensions of gover-
nance. Such trade-offs should be kept in mind when investigating specific cases more closely
and when formulating policy recommendations for a particular setting.
We acknowledge that other aspects of cabinet appointments may have governance conse-
quences, too, notably the personal characteristics of individuals selected for ministerial office
(Besley, 2005; Hallerberg & Wehner, 2020). This is illustrated by South African President Jakob
Zuma's deliberate appointment of incompetent and obedient ministers so as to facilitate corrup-
tion, for instance in December 2015 when he replaced his respected finance minister with an
obscure backbencher, precipitating a crash in the country's currency (Pauw, 2017, p. 20–21).
Moreover, the stability of cabinets is also important. Martínez-Gallardo (2010) notes that fre-
quent ministerial turnover has a negative effect on the ability of ministers to credibly commit to
long-term policy, with negative implications for policy stability and the quality of governance
more broadly. There may be a link between the personal characteristics of ministers, their turn-
over, and the size of cabinets, which deserves further analysis.
To what extent are the results relevant beyond Sub-Saharan Africa? The underlying argu-
ments linking cabinet size to poor governance in this context focus on the role of elite cli-
entelism. It is plausible that a similar pattern exists in other regions where this form of
clientelism is dominant. Yet settings where clientelistic relationships are weaker and program-
matic parties stronger may also suffer governance problems from overly large cabinets,
although perhaps for different reasons. For instance, an inquiry by a U.K. parliamentary
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committee detected “a growing consensus that the ever increasing number of ministers harms
the effectiveness of government” (House of Commons, 2010, p. 7) and described a range of
pathologies that can arise in governments with too many ministers. These include coordination
challenges and the proliferation of initiatives that serve to raise the public profile of individual
ministers but disrupt the smooth running of government. While, ultimately, questions of exter-
nal validity must be answered with further research, this suggests that large cabinets are likely
to be problematic more generally.
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ENDNOTES
1 In the words of van de Walle (2012, p. 114): “Hiring a member of one's ethnic group to a senior position in the
customs office is an example of patronage. Allowing the customs officer to use the position for personal enrich-
ment by manipulating import and export taxes is an example of a prebend.”
2 This approach is not limited to African countries. In the United Kingdom, there has been a significant increase
in junior ministers without cabinet rank over the past decades. This has boosted the “payroll vote,” comprising
Members of Parliament with a government job who are expected to vote as instructed or resign (House of
Commons, 2010, p. 8).
3 In addition, cabinet reshuffles can be used to create an atmosphere of “perpetual musical chairs” that prevents
individual ministers from amassing too much power (Roessler, 2011, p. 309).
4 Cabinet size is captured by the Polit10 variable in the 2018 edition of the Banks data set.
5 The correlation of our data with the Banks data is 0.73. In 55 cases, the ministerial count by Banks differs by
more than 10 from ours.
6 We also used a second index that captures wider public sector corruption and obtained very similar results. In
our sample, the correlation between the V-Dem executive and public sector corruption indices is 0.82.
7 The units of the WGI are those of a standard normal random variable, with zero mean, unit standard deviation,
and ranging approximately from −2.5 to 2.5 (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 9). Some extreme scores are outside this
range. In our sample, five scores are slightly below zero on our rescaled Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law
indicators (see Table A1). All five of these are for Somalia and fall between 2006 and 2009, a period of
civil war.
8 The estimates with this measure differ from those in an earlier working paper version (Wehner & Mills, 2020)
due to a small number of corrections to source data.
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APPENDIX A.
Cabinet: The number of ministers with full cabinet rank, excluding other members of the exec-
utive without cabinet rank, notably junior or deputy ministers, and individuals with lower-level
executive functions. Source: Arriola (2009) plus authors' updates from later editions of Europa
Publications, Africa South of the Sahara.
Control of Corruption (CC): Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “cap-
ture” of the state by elites and private interests. Rescaled so that most scores lie between about
0 and about 100, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Source: September 2018
update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, CCE.
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): Measure of perceived levels of public sector corruption
according to experts and businesspeople. Ranges from 0 to 100, with higher scores
corresponding to better outcomes. Source: Transparency International data compiled by Jeffry
Jacob; we made a small number of corrections where missing values had accidentally been
entered with a zero score.
Defense minister: Indicator of whether the defense minister is a military officer. 1 = military
officer, 0 = not a military officer. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Polit-
ical Institutions 2017, DEFMIN.
Electoral democracy: Measure of the extent to which the ideal of electoral democracy is
achieved. Ranges from 0 (not at all) to 1 (fully achieved). Source: July 2018 version of the V-
Dem data set, v2x_polyarchy.
Executive Corruption Index (ECI), reversed: Measures how routinely members of the execu-
tive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material induce-
ments, and how often they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state
resources for personal or family use. Rescaled to range from 0 (corrupt) to 100 (not corrupt).
Source: July 2018 version of the V-Dem data set, v2x_execorr.
GDP per capita: Log of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). Source: Word Bank, World
Development Indicators, March 2019, NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.
Government Effectiveness (GE): Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the qual-
ity of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commit-
ment to such policies. Rescaled so that most scores lie between about 0 and about 100, with
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Source: September 2018 update of the World-
wide Governance Indicators, GEE.
Government fractionalization: The probability that two deputies picked at random from
among the government parties will be of different parties. Ranges from 0 to 1. Source: Inter-
American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, GOVFRAC.
Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Human Development: Measures whether govern-
ments provide poverty mitigation and alleviation, educational advancement, health care and
medical and sanitary services. Ranges from 0 to 100, with higher scores corresponding to better
outcomes. Source: 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance.
Left: Party of the chief executive is communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing.
1 = left, 0 = not left. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institu-
tions 2017, EXECRLC.
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Military: Indicator of whether the chief executive is a military officer. 1 = military officer,
0 = not a military officer. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political
Institutions 2017, MILITARY.
Polity: Revised Combined Polity Score ranging from −10 (strongly autocratic) to +10
(strongly democratic). Source: October 2018 version of the Polity IV data set, polity2.
Programmatic parties: Following Cruz and Keefer (2015), the share of the largest three gov-
ernment parties and the largest opposition party that are right, left, or center in their orienta-
tion. When the orientation of a political party is either not discernible in the sources employed
or unrelated to economic policy, it is counted as non-programmatic. Ranges from 0 to 1. Source:
Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, GOV1RLC, GOV2-
RLC, GOV3RLC, OPP1RLC.
Regulatory Quality (RQ): Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector develop-
ment. Rescaled so that most scores lie between about 0 and about 100, with higher scores
corresponding to better outcomes. Source: September 2018 update of the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators, RQE.
Rule of Law (RL): Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Rescaled so
that most scores lie between about 0 and about 100, with higher scores corresponding to better
outcomes. Source: September 2018 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, RLE.
TABLE A1 Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Cabinet 1,797 22.809 7.632 5 53
Control of Corruption 735 37.285 12.473 12.626 74.335
Corruption Perceptions Index 594 30.017 11.173 8 65
Defense minister 1,489 0.413 0.493 0 1
Electoral democracy 1,797 0.334 0.208 0.072 0.851
Executive Corruption Index, reversed 1,797 37.641 24.546 2.244 91.965
GDP per capita (logged) 1,618 6.871 0.986 4.880 9.920
Government Effectiveness 734 34.826 12.512 1.082 70.873
Government fractionalization 1,351 0.123 0.223 0.000 0.876
Ibrahim Index, Human Development 332 50.072 13.650 8.200 89.400
Left 1,797 0.278 0.448 0 1
Military 1,620 0.390 0.488 0 1
Polity 1,729 −1.282 6.032 −9 10
Programmatic parties 1,366 0.433 0.415 0.000 1.000
Regulatory Quality 735 36.016 12.871 −2.901 72.545
Rule of Law 735 35.515 13.496 −2.129 71.543
Years in office 1,629 9.491 7.962 1 42
Years to election 1,219 2.326 1.648 0 7
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TABLE A2 Correlations between governance measures
GE RQ RL CC CPI ECI IIAG
Government Effectiveness 1.000
Regulatory Quality 0.880 1.000
Rule of Law 0.902 0.870 1.000
Control of Corruption 0.849 0.741 0.877 1.000
Corruption Perceptions Index 0.832 0.743 0.848 0.908 1.000
Executive Corruption Index, reversed 0.629 0.542 0.681 0.801 0.696 1.000
Ibrahim Index, Human Development 0.869 0.760 0.839 0.781 0.810 0.576 1.000
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Years in office: The number of years that the chief executive has been in office. Source:
Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, YRSOFFC.
Years to election: Years left in the current electoral term of the executive. Source: Inter-























Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
WEHNER AND MILLS 19
